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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal by the State of Idaho from the decision of Hon. John R. Stegner setting 
aside the Idaho Transpoliation Department's administrative license suspension of Karen Ann 
Kimbley ("Kimbley") for alleged failure of an evidentiary test for breath alcohol concentration. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts. 
On August 6,2011, at approximately 9:13 p.m., Latah County Sheriffs Deputy Darren 
Duke ("Duke") conducted a traffic stop of Kimbley. R. 34 .. Duke subsequently arrested 
Kimbley for DUI and transpOlied her to the Latah County jail. R. 33, 35. At the jail, Duke· 
checked Kimbley's mouth at 22:08:17. See video contained on ALS Ex. C. From 22:09:46 until 
22:15:45, Kimbley is searched by other officers and Duke wanders away from the search area 
numerous times. Immediately after the search was started, Duke moved around the comer from 
Kimbley and was looking into the Intoxilyzer room. Id. A 22:09:47. Because he was around the 
corner from Kimbley, she was out of his line of sight unti122:10:20. Id. At 22:12:16, Duke 
went to the doorway of the deputies' office and stated that "22:10" was his "first observed" time 
for the Intoxilyzer. Id He then walked into the interview room before returning to the search 
area at 22:12:48. Id At 22:15:48, Kimbley's mouth is checked a second time, which lasted 
until 22:16:00. Id 
At 22: 16:00, Duke directed Kimbley into the interview room. Id. As she entered, h~r 
back was to Duke. She sat across a table from Duke, and he played an audio recording of the 
statutory advisories. Id At 22:21:33, Duke explained that they were required to wait 15 minutes 
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after checking her mouth before she took a breath test. He stated that they had about "five more 
minutes." Id. 
Approximately nine minutes, 45 seconds, later (22:25:45 on the video), Duke directed 
Kimbley into the Intoxilyzer room. Id. While walking from one room to the other, Kimbley was 
in the lead with her back to Duke. Id 
Upon entering the Intoxilyzer room, Duke had Kimbley take a seat and he immediately 
went to work preparing the machine. Id During this prep time, he was facing a wall, which was 
perpendicular to Kimbley's location. Id 22:25:53. While prepping the machine, he entered 
information into the machine, and the machine can be heard making loud beeping noises. Duke 
then turned fUliher away from Kimbley to enter information into a notebook and turned back to 
the wall before having Kimbley come forward to take her breath test. The time during which 
Duke was facing away from Kimbley to prepare the machine and enter information into the 
notebook lasted approximately three minutes. Id. 22:25:53 - 22:29:14. 
After Kimbley made three failed attempts to provide a breath sample, she was informed 
that they would have to try again. Id. The recording then stops. When it resumes, Duke is in the 
process of explaining to Kimbley that she failed the tests and that she is being booked for DUL 
Id 
During the administrative hearing, Duke first testified that he made two different attempts 
at getting sufficient breath samples from Kimbley. Prior to the first attempt at getting a series of 
samples, he conducted a IS-minute observation period. ALS Hrg. Tr. 7:6-14. 
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Duke testified that, when he escOlied Kimbley into the jail, she was placed in the custody 
of the jail deputy to be searched and he then checked the time on the Intoxilyzer and noted it in 
his report. Id 7:19-23. Kimbley was not being searched in the same room as where the 
Intoxilyzer was located but the two rooms were adjacent. Id 8:2-11. According to Duke, he 
could stand with Kimbley in one room and look into the room and check the time on the 
Intoxilyzer. Id 8:11-12. Duke's testimony did not mention that he was around the corner and 
out of sight of Kimbley while checking the time on the Intoxilyzer or his numerous trips in and 
out of other rooms in the jail as evidenced in the video. 
Duke testified that he then escorted Kimbley into an interview room, gave her a copy of 
the lTD license suspension form, and played the advisory recording. During this time, Duke 
observed Kimbley. Id 8:21-25. He testified that, after approximately 13-14 minutes, he 
escorted Kimbley into the Intoxilyzer room, where he began entering information into the 
machine. Id 9:5-7. At the end of the first observation period, he attempted to obtain the first set 
of breath samples. However, the machine indicated the samples were deficient. He decided to 
try again and started a second 15 minute waiting period. Id 9:8-24. 
Duke testified that, during the second IS-minute period, he "just observed her the whole 
time" and that he did not replay the advisories. Id 10: 1-3. For the second observation period, 
Duke "walked her back into the interview room and essentially just sat in the room with her." Id 
10:9-10. There was nobody else in the room with Duke and Kimbley. Id 11 :4-5. There were 
other jail deputies in their office, which is approximately eight feet from the interview room with 
two windows in between. Id 11:9-18. 
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Duke testified that he had told the jail deputies his new start time and the time he would 
like to take samples. Id 11 :23-25. He waited approximately 13 minutes with Kimbley, and, 
when the deputies prompted him a couple of minutes before the end ofthe monitoring period, he 
escorted Kimbley back to the breath testing room where he programmed the machine. Id. 11:23 
-12:2. 
Duke testified that the prosecutor's assistant informed him that the second observation 
period was not included in the video.Id 12:3-7. According to Duke's testimony, after the first 
test attempt, he turned off his recording in order to call his sergeant and discuss whether to try 
another breath test or take Kimbley for a blood draw. Id 12:9-18. In speaking to his sergeant, it 
was decided that they would try another breath test before resorting to a blood draw. Id 12:23 
13:3. When Kimbley was providing the second set of breath samples, Duke checked his recorder 
and noticed that it was off. Id. 12:20-22. 
Kimbley then testified that she had not had an opportunity to see the video footage 
referenced during Duke's testimony, nor had anyone described the details of that video footage 
to her. Id 14:9-16. Kimbley then testified regarding the details of her an-ivaI at the jail and 
search consistent with what was depicted on the video. Id. 14:22 - 15:7. During the pat down, 
she did not notice where Duke was or what he was doing. Id. 15:8-12. 
Kimbley testified that, after the search, she was taken into a room with a table and chairs 
and listened to an audiotape. Id 15: 13-17. She was then taken into another room and given a 
breath test. Id 15:17-19. During the search and the playing of the audiotape, nobody mentioned 
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to her that they were conducting a IS-minute observation period, so she had no idea when those 
15 minutes began. Id 15:20 16:2. 
During the first attempts at providing breath samples, she was told that she did not give 
sufficient samples and that it would be marked as a refusal. Id 16:5-18. After the first set of 
attempts, she was taken back into the little room with the table and chairs where she had earlier 
listened to the audiotape. Id. 16:19-23,17:1-6. She was told to wait there and they would give 
her 15 minutes until the next tests. Id 16:23-25. 
Kimbley testified that, during this period, Duke remained in the room with her only part 
of the time. Id 17:7-10. He sat with her for a few minutes and then he got up and went into 
another office where other officers were sitting. Duke walked back and fOlih between the two 
rooms. Id 17: 13-23. She estimated that he came into and left the room two to three times 
during this period. Id 17:24 -18:2. Duke did go out of Kimbley's sight a couple of the times 
when he walked away. Id 18:11-12. 
Following Kimbley's testimony, Moody gave Duke an oppoliunity to comment. Id 
18 :21- 19: 18. Duke explained that he may have had Kimbley move back into the observation 
room while he was making a phone call to his sergeant, then told her that they were going to give 
her another chance at the breath test, and then went back into the Intoxilyzer room to the check 
the time. Id 19: 1 0-16. Duke stated that he could not be sure given that he did not have a 
recording to review. Id 19: 16-18. 
After Duke finished testifying, Kimbley'S counsel argued that the IS-minute observation 
period prior to the second breath test was insufficient. Id. 20:6 - 25: 18. In support of this 
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argument, counsel cited the SOPs related to the observation period, as well as case law which 
provides standards related to the quality of observation. Id 20:6 ~ 21: 16. Further, counsel 
compared discrepancies between Duke's testimony about the first observation and what is shown 
on the video evidence submitted by Kimbley. Id 21: 17 -- 22:24. 
Counsel also pointed out that, comparing Duke's testimony regarding the first 
observation period with the reality of the video evidence was relevant to the weight that should 
be given to Duke's testimony about the second observation period, especially in light of the fact 
that he changed his testimony indicating that he may have left the interview room where 
Kimbley was seated. Id 21:17-22; 23:2-9. 
Moody sustained Kimbley's administrative license suspension. R.84-93. Kimbley 
timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review (R. 8-9), and oral argument was held in front of the 
Honorable John R. Stegner on February 16,2012. At the hearing, in response to the State's 
argument that it was being asked to reweigh the hearing examiner's credibility determination, the 
District Court stated: 
If it were just a pure credibility determination, I think I would throw in with you. 
But my dilemma is when Kimbley testifies that he left the room during the second 
period, and the hearing officer gives Duke the opportunity to respond to that, he 
doesn't ~ he doesn't dispute her characterization of the testimony. 
And if he left the room, then I think the procedure hasn't been followed. And so 
now I'm she has direct testimony that he left the room during the second testing 
period. And he doesn't contradict that. So, I don't know that that's truly a 
credibility determination. 
Dist. Ct. Transcr. 20:12-23 (Feb. 16.2012). The Court went on to state: 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF 6 
Well, I think if Duke had gotten on the stand after Kimbley testified and said, I 
stayed with her the entirety of the time, 1'd affirm. But I don't have that 
testimony. 
But I think and maybe this is more philosophy than law, that when a device is 
being used to say, you no longer get to drive, that you ought to scrupulously 
comply with whatever requirements have been set out, and without that 
scrupulous performance, I'm not willing to say that that test is valid. 
Jd 24:3-22. 
Kimbley's counsel's further argued that because Kimbley testified Duke left the 
observation room and because Duke's testimony was internally inconsistent (first that he did not 
leave the room and then that he might have left the room), there was not sufficient evidence to 
support the hearing examiner's decision. The Court then set aside Moody's decision stating: 
Well, I agree. Had Duke said, no, I sat with her the entirety of the 15 minutes, I 
would affirm, but because he vacillates in his response to her testimony, I'm 
setting aside the ALS determination. 
Id 25:11--26:13. 
U. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the officer conducted a proper IS-minute observation period prior to 
administering the breath alcohol test when he was not always in a position to use a combination 
of his senses of sight, hearing, and smell for monitoring the test subject. 
2. Whether the District Court correctly vacated the hearing examiner's decision 
because it was based on clearly elToneous findings and because the court applied the COlTect 
standard of review. 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
At the administrative hearing, the driver must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
one of the following grounds: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-
8006, Idaho Code; or 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of 
section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were 
not conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-
8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning 
properly when the test was administered; or 
( e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7). 
If the driver makes an initial prima facie showing for vacation of the suspension, the 
burden shifts to the state to rebut the evidence presented by the driver. Masterson v. lTD, 150 
Idaho 126, 128 (Ct App. 2010). The driver meets this burden at an ALS hearing by showing that 
a mandatory procedure, "such as the IS-minute waiting period," was not followed. Wheeler v. 
lTD, 148 Idaho 378, 384-385 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing In re Suspension 0/ Driver's License 0/ 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 944 (Ct. App. 2006)); Bennett v. State of Idaho, Dept. a/Transportation, 
147 Idaho 141, 144 (Ct. App. 2009). The hearing officer is required to vacate the suspension. 
ld. 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF 8 
On judicial review of an agency action, the reviewing court is governed by the following 
standard of review: 
[T]he court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the 
action was: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority ofthe agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C. § 67-5279(3). In addition, the agency action shall be aHirmed unless a substantial right of 
the challenging party is prejudiced. I.e. § 67-5279(4). 
The reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to weight of 
the evidence on questions of fact and defers to the agency's findings unless they are clearly 
eLToneous. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Wilkinson v. State, Dept. ojTransp., 151 Idaho 784, 786 (Ct. App. 
2011). Mere conflicting evidence before the agency is insufficient for a clearly erroneous 
finding as long as the agency's determinations are suppOlied by substantial and competent 
evidence in the record. Schroeder v. State, 147 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2009). 
However, the reviewing court is not bound by the agency's factual determinations if they 
are not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. See ld "Substantial 
evidence" is not a mere "scintilla" but is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." Masterson v. lTD, 150 Idaho at 128. Further, the court does 
exercise free review on questions of law, including interpretation of administrative rules or 
regulations. See Schroeder v. State, 147 Idaho at 479 (citation omitted). 
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On appeal, this COUli reviews the agency record independently of the District Court's 
decision. Wilkinson v. State, 151 Idaho at 786. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Duke did not Conduct a Proper 15-Minute Observation Period Prior to 
Administering the Breath Alcohol Test to Kimbley because he was not Always in a 
Position to Use a Combination of his Senses of Sight, Hearing, and Smell to .Monitor 
her. 
Without sufficient surveillance during the monitoring period prior to administering a 
breath test, officers are unable to satisfy the SOP requirement of being alert for any event that 
might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. This negates the ability to lay foundation 
for admissibility of the test results without expeli testimony regarding their reliability. 
Although officers are not required to "stare fixedly" at a test subject for the full 15-
minute period, "the level of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to 
accomplish the purpose ofthe requirement." State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 453 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
Here, Moody's finding that the evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho 
Code and SOPs is not supported by substantial in the record. The testimony demonstrated that, 
during the first 13 minutes of the second observation period, Duke left the room. FUliher, the 
video demonstrates that during the final few minutes of the first monitoring period, Duke walked 
behind Kimbley into the testing room, and was across the room with his attention and body 
turned away from Kimbley for approximately three minutes while he prepared the breath testing 
machine and made notations in a notebook. Duke testified to similar procedures for the second 
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monitoring period (walking Kimbley from one room to another and preparing the machine for 
testing). During the time he was preparing the machine, his senses were impaired because his 
sight was focused on the machine and the notebook, his hearing and smell were impaired 
because he was across the room, and his hearing was further impaired because of significant 
noise emanating from the machine. 
1. The SOPs in Effect at the Time of Kimbley's Breath Alcohol Test Required a 
Monitoring Period that Consisted of Alert Observation by the Officer Prior 
to Administration of the Test. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) charges the Idaho State Police ("ISP") with promulgating standards for 
administration of tests for alcohol content, which substitutes for laying foundation for 
admissibility of the test results. See State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 857, 859 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Wheeler v. lTD, 148 Idaho 378, 386-387 (Ct. App. 2009) (Lansing, J., dissenting). Therefore, 
ISP has issued training manuals for the approved testing equipment, as well as Standard 
Operating Procedures ("SOPs") for breath alcohol testing. Wilkinson v. State, 151 Idaho at 787 
(citing IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 11.03.01.014). "Noncompliance with these procedures is one of 
the grounds for vacating an administrative license suspension under I.e. § 18-8002A(7)(d)." Id. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test 
for· alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
celiification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by 
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police 
shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
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The legislature's intent in charging ISP with promulgating standards was ensuring the 
accuracy of the test results to substitute for otherwise necessary foundational requirements for 
admissibility. As stated in Wheeler v. lTD, the language was added in part, "to avoid the 
economic burden to the state to have to furnish witnesses to provide superfluous verification [of 
the reliability of the testing equipment]." 148 Idaho at 387 (emphasis added). 
FUliher, 
As the legislative statements of purpose indicate, this statutory scheme is intended 
to streamline trials and reduce the costs of prosecution while at the same time 
assuring the accuracy of the tests. It can meet this objective and can accord 
with due process and demands of fundamental fairness only if there actually 
exist promulgated standards for administration of RAe tests that ensure 
accurate and reliable test results. In other words, the quid pro quo for the 
convenience and economy of admitting test results pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4) 
is that the ISP must promulgate ascertainable standards that, if complied with, 
will yield accurate BAC testing. 
ld. (emphasis added). 
The SOPs relevant to Kimbley's breath test were effective November 1,2010. R. 171-
191. The introductory paragraph to SOP § 6 states, "Proper testing procedure by celiified 
operators is necessary in order to provide accurate results." (Emphasis added.) This statement 
clearly explains that the purpose of this SOP section is to ensure the accuracy of test results. 
SOP § 6 goes on to provide, in part: 
6.1 Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the subjectlindividual should be 
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. Any material which 
absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior 
to the start of the 15 minute waiting period. During the monitoring period 
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the subject/individual should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or 
belchlburp/vomit/regurgitate. 
6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the Operator must be alert for any event 
that might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. 
6.1.4.2 If, during the I5-minute waiting period, the subject/individual 
vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the 
subjectlindividual's breath pathway, the I5-minute'waiting period 
must begin again. 
(Emphasis added.) 
At a brief glance, the "should" language contained in SOP 6.1 seems to indicate that 
monitoring prior to administration of the test is no longer mandatory. See Wheeler v. lTD, 148 
Idaho at 384. However, that provision CaIIDot be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire SOP § 6. When § 6 is read as a whole, § 6.1 states how long the monitoring 
should last, and § 6.1.4 states how the monitoring period must be conducted and when it must be 
restarted. Therefore, there is still a requirement for monitoring prior to administering the breath 
test. 
However, additional materials developed by ISP and posted on their website fmiher 
emphasize the importance of the I5-minute monitoring period and its necessity for ensuring the 
reliability of test results and their admissibility without expert testimony. The Intoxilyzer 5000 
Series Reference Manual (effective 12/1611 0), provides a list of topics addressed in the 
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"Operator Class." R. 13 5 and available online at http://www. isp. idaho.govljorensicldocuments/ 
IdahoIntox5000SeriesReferenceManuaIRev1.pdf, accessed Nov. 7, 2011 and September 1,2012. 
Item 13 states "[tJhe purpose and importance of the IS-minute waiting period." Id (emphasis 
added). 
In addition, the ISP slide show for Breath Testing Operator Class discusses the 
standardized procedure for breath testing. R. 137-143 and available online at 
http://isp.idaho.govljorensiclalcohol.html, accessed Nov. 26,2011 and September 1,2012 (see 
"ISPFS Instrument Operator Training, Module One - Alcohol"). The slide show instructs 
officers to follow procedures to preserve the evidentiary value of the test and the automatic 
admissibility of the test results. R. 138. The slide slow states that the most important step is the 
"15 minute monitoring period," which it emphasizes with three exclamation marks. R. 139. The 
slide show also encourages officers to "not cut the time close." R. 139. 
When interpreting a statute or rule, the Court "has a duty to asceliain the legislative 
intent, and give effect to that intent." Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 
257, 263 (2009) (citations omitted). Rules of construction require that the. court begin with the 
literal language of a statute or rule and give those words their plain, usual, or ordinary meaning. 
Id 
However, "provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire document .... [TJhe Court must give effect to all the words and provisions 
of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. 
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Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also 
Wheeler v. lTD, 148 Idaho at 384. 
The present situation is much different than that before the Court in Wheeler v. lTD. 
There, the Court held that, because the SOP regarding calibration of the Intoxilzyer 5000 used 
the language "should" rather than "must," the calibration procedure was not mandatory. ld at 
768. Therefore, the standard did not automatically render the test result inadmissible. ld In 
making this decision, the COUli stated that "should" is read differently than "must" in order "to 
give due credit to the promulgating pmiy's intent in repeatedly choosing to use the word 
'should' instead of 'must' or 'shall'." ld (emphasis added). 
If SOP §6.1 is interpreted to mean that no monitoring is required, then §§ 6.1.4 and 
6.1.4.2, which require the operator to be alert and/or to restart or repeat the monitoring period, 
would be rendered void and superfluous. Here, while SOP § 6.1 used the word "should" with 
regard to the length of the monitoring, §§ 6.1.4 and 6.1.4.2 both used the word "must" to 
describe the standard for how to conduct the monitoring period and when to restart or repeat 
monitoring. FUliher, references are made to the importance of a IS-minute monitoring period in 
the Intoxilyzer 5000 Series Reference Manual, as well as in the ISP training slide show. 
In Appellant's Brief, the State relies on SOP § 6.1.4.3 to argue that looking at the test 
results themselves to determine their reliability is sufficient and renders unnecessary any quality 
control for the monitoring period or cures insufficient monitoring prior to administration of the 
test. That section reads: 
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SOP § 6.1.4.3. 
If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute 
monitoring period, the officer should look at results of the duplicate breath 
samples for evidence of potential alcohol contamination. For clarification 
see section 6.2.2.2. 
However, there are flaws in the State's argument. First, if the Court adopts the State's 
interpretation that this provision overrides the need for a quality monitoring period prior to 
administration of the breath test, then SOP §§ 6.1.3,6.1.4,6.1.4.2, and 6.2.2.1 would be void and 
superfluous. 
Second, § 6.1.4 states that "[dJuring the monitoring period, the Operator must be alert 
for any event that might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test." (Emphasis added.) 
Checking the test results as mentioned in § 6.1.4.3 is something that the officer may do after the 
monitoring period. Therefore, it is not a substitute for a requirement that is to occur during the 
monitoring period. 
In addition, the State relies on SOP § 6.1.4.1 to argue that "the emphasis on the 
circumstances of the waiting period isn't as heavy as it may have been when the Idaho Appellate 
Court decided State v. Carson or State v. DeFranco." Appellant's Br. at 7. However, § 6.1.4.1 
is identical to § 3.1.5.1, which was found in the July 2009 version of the SOPs. R. 184. While 
that earlier version of the SOPs does post-date the decisions in Carson and DeFranco, it was the 
version in effect at the time of Wilkinson because that driver was stopped in October 2009. 151 
Idaho at 785. Despite that provision in the SOPs, the Wilkinson Court engaged in an extensive 
analysis ofthe circumstances of the monitoring period. Jd at 787-789. Therefore, the State's 
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argument that § 6.1.4.1 minimizes the importance of the circumstances occurring during the 
monitoring period is misplaced and not justified by the case law. 
Therefore, officers are still required to conduct a monitoring period prior to administering 
the breath test and case law regarding the quality of that monitoring period is still relevant in 
light of the SOPs in effect at the time of Kimbley's breath test. 
2. Duke's Surveillance of Kimbley was y Insufficient because he Left Kimbley 
Alone ~n th_e Monitoring Room. 
The level of surveillance during the second monitoring period was insufficient because 
evidence demonstrates that Duke left Kimbley alone in the monitoring room. 
Officers must conduct surveillance oftest subjects that is "reasonably expected to 
accomplish the purpose of [the monitoring requirement]." State v. Carson, 133 Idaho at 453. 
This level of surveillance requires that officers not leave subjects unattended during any portion 
of the monitoring period. See Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho 141, 144 eet. App. 2009); see also 
State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127 eet. App. 1993). 
At the ALS hearing, Duke first testified that during the second, unrecorded, monitoring 
period, he "essentially" stayed in the room with Kimbley during the first 13 minutes of the 
monitoring period. ALS Hrg. TranscL 10:9-10. Kimbley then testified that Duke left the room 
two to three times during this period while he walked back and forth between the monitoring 
room and another room where other deputies were located, and that he left her sight on a couple 
of these occasions. Id 17:7 18:12. 
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After Kimbley testified, Moody gave Duke an opportunity to make an additional 
statement in response to Kimbley's testimony. Id. 18:21 -19:3. At that time, rather than using 
the opportunity to controveli Kimbley's testimony, Duke testified that he may have left the room 
but that he could not specifically remember. Id. 19:5 18. 
Therefore, the evidence before the hearing examiner from Kimbley was that Duke left the 
room and from Duke was that he may have left the room but could not remember for sure. 
Given Kimbley's uncontroverted testimony that Duke left the room, there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to support Moody's decision that the monitoring period was sufficiently 
conducted, and Kimbley's license suspension should have been vacated. 
This very evidence was the focus of the District Court's decision to set aside the ALS 
suspension. D.C. Hrg. Transcr. 20:18-23; 24:3-6; 25:11 - 26:13. That decision was correct based 
on the evidence in the record, and the District Court' sdecision should be upheld. 
3. Duke's Surveillance of Kimbley was Insufficient because he was not 
Continually Positioned Physically to Use a Combination of his Senses While 
\Valking Kimbley between Rooms and While Preparing the Machine for 
Testing. 
The combination of the video submitted by Kimbley and the testimony at the hearing by 
Kimbley and Duke demonstrates that Duke's surveillance was insufficient to accomplish the goal 
of the monitoring period. While walking Kimbley to the breath testing room and while preparing 
the testing equipment, Duke was not always in a physical position to use a combination of his 
senses of sight, smell, and hearing to ensure Kimbley did not belch, burp, or regurgitate. 
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Although officers are not required to "stare fixedly" at a test subject for the full 
monitoring period, "the level of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to 
accomplish the purpose of the [monitoring] requirement." State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 453 
(Ct. App. 1999). However, even if an officer remains in close proximity to the subject, the 
officer's mode of surveillance must be sufficient to "likely detect belching, regurgitation into the 
mouth, or the like." State v. Carson, 133 Idaho at 453. There, a portion of the monitoring period 
included the time the officer spent transporting the driver to the sheriffs office, during which he 
intermittently observed the driver through glances in the rearview mirror. Id. at 452-453. The 
court pointed out that, during the trip, the officer's "attention necessarily was devoted primarily 
to driving." Id. at 453. Further, the court explained that a combination of factors impeded the 
officer's ability to hear whether the driver belched. Those factors included noise from the 
automobile engine, tires on the road surface, rain, windshield wipers, and a hearing impairment. 
Id. 
Officers must be in a position at all times during the monitoring period to use all of their 
senses, not just the sense of sight. See Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho at 144. When an officer is not 
in a position to use his sight for monitoring a driver, he must be able to use his combined senses 
of hearing and smell. See State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 338 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In DeFranco, after completing the field sobriety tests, the officer handcuffed the driver 
and placed him in the rear passenger-side of the patrol car. Id. at 336. The officer left the rear 
car door ajar while he walked to the back of the vehicle to obtain an advisory fonn from his 
trunk. Id The officer testified that, while at the trunk, he could see the driver through the rear 
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window by looking through a gap between the trunk: lid and the vehicle body. Id Further, the 
officer testified that, had the driver belched or coughed loudly, he would have heard it. Id 
However, the court held that the officer's "level of monitoring could not reasonably be 
expected to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Id at 337. The court pointed out that, 
as in Carson, the officer "was not always in a physical position to use either his sight or, 
alternatively, his senses of smell and hearing, to accomplish the purpose ofthe monitoring 
period." Id at 338. 
The courts in both Carson and DeFranco distinguished their situations from that found in 
State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338 (Ct. App. 1994). See State v. Carson, 133 Idaho at 453; State 
v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 337. In Remsburg, the driver argued that the monitoring period was 
insufficient because, during the seven minutes immediately preceding the breath test, the officer 
was programming the breath testing machine and reading the statutory advisory. 126 Idaho at 
339. The Remsburg court held that the monitoring period was sufficient because the officer was 
in the same room with the driver at all times. Id However, the court specifically pointed out 
that the driver was seated next to the officer. Id at 339 (n. 1). 
Therefore, in Carson and DeFranco, the court distinguished Remsburg by pointing out 
that, although the Remsburg officer "did not maintain constant visual contact, there was no 
evidence that the officer was unable to adequately monitor through use of his other senses." 
State v. Carson, 133 Idaho at 453; State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 337. Further, Carson 
demonstrates that not all close proximity is created equal. An officer can be in close proximity 
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to the driver (even in the same vehicle) but conditions may exist that render the monitoring 
insufficient. 
This Court most recently considered the quality of monitoring in Wilkinson v. State, 151 
Idaho 784 eCt. App. 2011). The Wilkinson Court built on the principles already established in 
Carson, DeFranco, and Bennett and took the opportunity to caution officers on the importance of 
a quality monitoring period. There, as here, the officer turned his back on the driver during the 
monitoring period. Id. at 788. The Court stated: 
It should be noted that although constant visual contact is not required, the 
rule's flexibility is not an open invitation for law enforcement officers to 
be inattentive or to leave suspects out of their sight for any appreciable 
period of time. Officer Davis had his back turned to Wilkinson for one 
minute and fifty seconds ofthe fifteen-minute period, a length of time that 
could have voided the test results. Better practice would counsel that 
officers should attend to suspects to the best oftheir ability, including 
visual observation, throughout the entire monitoring period if at all 
possible. In such cases, the issue presented here could be completely 
avoided. 
Id. Ultimately, the Court held that monitoring was sufficient in large part because a second 
officer was present in the room patting down the driver during the period when Officer Davis' 
back was turned. Id. at 788-789. This is in stark contrast to the situation in this case because 
Duke was alone with Kimbley during the monitoring period. See ALS Ex. C. 
There is no video of the second monitoring period in this case. Hciwever, there is video 
of the first monitoring period including Duke preparing the machine for testing, which took 
approximately three minutes immediately preceding Kimbley providing the first breath sample. 
Further, with regard to the second monitoring period, Duke testified that he waited 13 minutes 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF 21 
and then moved Kimbley from the interview room to the breath testing room and he programmed 
the machine, which is the same procedure he followed in during the first, recorded monitoring 
period. ALS Hrg. TranscL 11 :19 - 12:2. We know from the video of the first monitoring period 
that the machine preparation took approximately three minutes, which is a length of time over 
one minute longer than the Wilkinson Court found troubling. We also know from the video that 
while entering information into the machine, Duke was across the room from Kimbley and 
facing a wall that was perpendicular to Kimbley. We know from the video that during the first 
monitoring period, he turned further away from Kimbley to write in a notebook. In addition, we 
know from the video that the machine, which was positioned directly in front of Duke, made a 
series of loud beeping noises while he was preparing it. Because of this, for approximately three 
minutes, Duke's attention was primarily focused on preparing the breath testing machine rather 
than on monitoring Kimbley and he was not continually in a physical position to use a 
combination of his senses of sight, smell, and hearing to monitor her. 
Therefore, for approximately three minutes, Duke's attention was primarily devoted to 
preparing the breath testing machine and, while doing so, he was not continually physically 
positioned to use a combination of his senses of sight, smell, and hearing to monitor Kimbley. 
Therefore, Duke's monitoring of Kimbley was insufficient. 
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B. The District Court Correctly Vacated Moody's Decision and Remanded the Matter 
because it was Based on Clearly Erroneous Findings and because the District Court 
Applied the Conect Standard of Review. 
1. lVloody's Decision was Based on Clearly Erroneous Findings. 
Based on the transcript of the hearing and the video evidence presented, several of 
Moody's findings are clearly elToneous and led to a decision that was not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
a. Moody found that "Unlike Kimbley's ALS testimony, the DVD (Exhibit 
C) at 22:21 :33 provides Deputy Duke informing Kimbley about the fifteen-minute monitoring 
period and the reasons for the monitoring period." R., 089, ,p. 
However, the above portion of video is of Duke explaining the 15 minute observation 
period to Kimbley after playing the advisories for her, which occulTed after Kimbley was 
searched, and it does not include an explanation of when the period began. Kimbley did not 
testify that she was never told about the 15 minute waiting period. Rather, she testified that, 
while she was being searched and listening to the advisory, nobody told her about the 15 minute 
waiting period or when that period began. ALS Hrg. Tr. 15:20 - 16:2. The explanation by Duke 
referred to by Moody occurred after the search and after the audiotaped advisory was finished. 
See ALS Ex. C. at 22:21:33. 
b. Moody found that "Deputy Duke's ALS testimony noted the reasons for 
leaving Kimbley's location after Kimbley's first breath test and prior to the start of her second 
monitoring period." R., 089, 'if7. 
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However, Duke's testimony was inconsistent about the conditions under which he left 
Kimbley's side: 
1. Duke testified that, after the first breath test attempts, he contacted 
his sergeant to determine whether to attempt another breath test or go for a blood draw. 
ALS Hrg. Tr. 9:19-24; 12:9 13:3. He then moved Kimbley back to the interview room 
"and essentially just sat in the room with her." Id. 10: 1-1 O. He waited with Kimbley for 
approximately 13 minutes in the interview room and then moved her back to the 
Intoxilyzer room while he again programmed the machine. Id 11:23 12:2. 
11. After Kimbley testified that Duke had left the interview room (and 
was out of sight) several times during the second monitoring period, Duke altered his 
testimony. He admitted that he may have left the interview room during the second 
monitoring period to call his sergeant and check the time in the Intoxilyzer room, which 
could explain why he was in and out of the room. Id 19: 10-16. However, without 
reviewing the recording, he could not be certain what had occurred. Id 19:16-18. 
c. Moody found that "Kimbley's testimony noted she assumed the number of 
times Deputy Duke left her presence and she had no idea when or if he had restmied the 
monitoring period." R., 089, ~9. 
Kimbley did estimate the number of times Duke left the room at two or three times. ALS 
Hrg. Tr. 17: 16 - 18 :2. She did not, however, guess as to whether he left the room. Her 
testimony was quite clear that he had left the interview room and had left her sight. Id 
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Further, Kimbley did not testify that "she had no idea when or if he had restarted the 
monitoring period" with regard to the second monitoring period as stated by Moody. Rather, she 
testified definitively that "[ a]nd I was told to wait there and they were going to give me 15 
minutes until the next tests were done." ALS Rrg. Tr. 16:23-25. 
d. Moody found that "It is reasonable to deduce if Deputy Duke conducted 
Kimbley's first evidentiary breath testing sequence in accordance with ISPFS SOPs, by natural 
habit, Deputy Duke would follow proper procedures again when he restarted the monitoring 
period for Kimbley's second evidentiary breath testing sequence." R., 090, ~11 (emphasis 
added). 
This erroneously presumes Duke conducted a proper monitoring period prior to the first 
set of breath tests. However, the video demonstrates problems with the monitoring period: 
1. While moving Kimbley from the interview room to the Intoxilyzer 
room, Kimbley was walking ahead of Duke and, therefore, had her back to him. His 
ability to use his senses of sight, smell, and hearing would be impaired. 
11. Once they entered the Intoxilyzer room, Duke had Kimbley take a 
seat and he immediately went to work preparing the machine. During this time, he was 
facing a wall, which was in a direction perpendicular from the direction of Kimbley. 
While prepping the machine, he had to enter information into the machine, and the 
machine can be heard making loud beeping noises. Duke then turns further away from 
Kimbley to enter information into a notebook and then turns back to the wall before 
having Kimbley come forward to take her breath test. The time during which Duke was 
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facing away from Kimbley to prepare the machine and enter information into the 
notebook lasted approximately three minutes. 
If "by natural habit" Duke would have conducted the second monitoring period in the 
same manner as he conducted the first, the video demonstrates that it was not sufficient. 
e. Moody found that "Kimbley's recollection of what occurred between the 
first and second evidentiary breath testing sequence is based on upon at [ sic] time when her 
memory was impaired." 
However, this ignores Kimbley's extensive testimony describing the events occurring 
when she arrived at the jail and during the first monitoring period and breath test. ALS Hrg. 
TranscL 13: 18 16: 18. She explained that she had not had an opportunity to view the video nor 
did anyone describe it to her. Id. 14:9-16. Yet her testimony was consistent with what was 
depicted in the video establishing that her recollection of the events was not impaired. 
Mere conflicting evidence is not enough for a clearly erroneous finding. However, this 
case involves much more than that. After Kimbley testified, Duke himself changed his 
testimony and acknowledged that he may have left the room during the second monitoring 
period. Further, as explained above, there is substantial evidence in the record demonstrating 
Moody's numerous clearly erroneous findings. At the most, there was a mere scintilla of 
evidence supporting Moody's decision; but a scintilla is not enough. Many of Moody's findings 
were clearly erroneous based on the video and testimonial evidence. Further, Moody failed to 
consider discrepancies between Duke's testimony and the video evidence, including but not 
necessarily limited to: 
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a. Duke testified that he could remain in the same room where Kimbley was 
being searched while checking the time on the Intoxilyzer. Duke did not mention that he 
was around the corner and out of sight of Kimb ley during this time. 
b. Duke did not mention his wanderings in and out of several different rooms 
in the jail while Kimbley was being searched. 
c. Duke testified that, after Kimbley was search, he observed her for 13-14 
minutes in the interview room. However, the video shows that they were only in the 
interview room for 9 minutes, 45 seconds. 
2. The District Court Applied the Correct Standard of Review. 
The State argues that the District Court decision set a new standard of review of 
"scrupulous compliance" that is higher than what the Idaho Appellate Courts have determined is 
appropriate. Appellant's Br. at 14. However, this incorrectly interprets the District Court's 
holding. Rather, the District Court stated that officers must "scrupulously comply with whatever 
requirements have been set out." Dist. Ct. TranscL 24:11-22. When the District Court was 
discussing scrupulous compliance, it was not discussing the standard of review. Rather, the 
District Court was referring to how officers should perform their duties in light of the standards 
that have been set. The District Court's "scrupulous compliance" requirement is no different that 
the requirement that an administrative suspension be vacated if the officer did not comply with 
mandatory procedures. 
Later, the Qistrict Court stated it agreed with Kimbley's counsel that there was not 
sufficient evidence for the hearing examiner's decision based on Duke's inconsistent, changing 
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testimony. Id 25:11 - 26:13. It is clear from the context ofthese two pOliions of the Comi 
transcript that the Court understood the standard of review and that the term "scrupulous 
compliance" was in reference to how officers should follow procedures, not the Court's standard 
of review. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Kimbley met her burden of showing that the monitoring period was insufficient and that 
there was insufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support Moody's decision. Therefore, 
the Court should afIinn the District Court's decision, which set aside Moody's decision and 
remanded the matter lTD. 
v/ejt... 
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